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Abstract
This paper, by using data from a survey of 3,073 private enter-
prises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of govern-
ment vis-à-vis market, which is the distinguishing feature of various
models of a market economy including private orderings, private lit-
igations through courts, and regulatory state (Glaeser and Shleifer,
2002, 2003; Djankov et al., 2003). It is found that enterprises located
in regions with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market enjoy
better performance, suggesting that regulatory state is an appropri-
ate model of a market economy for China. Evidence is also presented
to rule out the concern that these results are driven by rent-seeking
activities.
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1 Introduction
Many developing economies have started to introduce private ownership and
market competition after failures of experimenting with state ownership in
much of the twentieth century. In the transition from state ownership to
a market economy, however, there are di¤erent ideas and practices. The
Washington Consensus, on one extreme, proposes to "stabilize, privatize,
and liberalize", i.e., maintaining macroeconomic stability, pushing for do-
mestic liberalization, privatization and openness to international trade, and
drastically reducing the role of the state in the economic sphere.1 Meanwhile,
China has followed a di¤erent route: the role of government in the economy,
such as enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws and national ordinances,
has remained signicant after three decades of economic reforms (Walder,
1995; Rodrik, 2006).
The di¤erent approaches to transiting toward a market economy could
reect the fundamental di¤erences in the understanding of what a market
economy should look like. Indeed, there are three distinct models of a mar-
ket economy, i.e., private orderings, private litigation through courts, and
regulatory state, which involve an increasing power of government vis-à-vis
market. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003), and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) o¤er a general framework for under-
standing the choice among the di¤erent models of a market economy. It is
argued that, for a market economy to function properly, governments should
provide protections to investors against expropriation by thieves, competi-
tors, or tort-feasors, which are called disorder (Hobbes, 1651). At the same
time, governments should refrain from becoming expropriators themselves,
which could lead to dictatorship. The control of disorder may lead to greater
dictatorship while the control of government abuse may bring larger disorder
(for details see Figure 1, which is copied from Figure 1 of Djankov, Glaeser,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003). The challenge is to nd an
appropriate model to balance these two costs simultaneously.
Clearly, the Washington Consensus is leaned toward private orderings
and private litigation through courts as the most ideal models of a market
economy so that it advocates for minimizing the role of government in the
economy. However, these target models of a market economy require a host
of preconditions for them to function properly. Specically, for private or-
derings to be an e¢ cient choice, it requires protection of private property
1This has been the guiding principle for economic reforms in most of the former socialist
economies, Latin America, Africa, and South and East Asia (Williamson, 1989; Blanchard,
Dornbusch, Krugman, Layard and Summers, 1992; Blanchard, Boycko, Dabrowski, Dorn-
busch, Layard and Shleifer, 1993; Rodrik, 2006).
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rights of one market participant against another. Meanwhile, private liti-
gation hinges upon independent judges who are immune to inuences from
the rich and the politically-connected. In the former socialist economies,
however, the property rights protection for private enterprises has yet to be
formally established and time tested. Judges, who were not needed at all in
the central-planning system, are newly appointed by the state and their in-
dependence is dubious (Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2008). Indeed almost
all other developing economies share the same lack or weakness of institu-
tions that are required for the models of a market economy (i.e., private
orderings and private litigation through courts) proposed by the Washington
Consensus. That might be the reason why developing economies following
the Washington Consensus did not display impressive economic performance
(Rodrik, 2006). And it may well be the case that regulatory state (i.e., sig-
nicant power of government vis-à-vis market) could be an optimal model of
a market economy for these economies.2
The success of economic reforms in countries like China, India and Viet-
nam has often been interpreted as the victory of an incremental and cau-
tious reform procedure. However, from the perspective of the choice of a
right model of a market economy, it could well be the result of having cho-
sen a suitable target model (i.e., regulatory state) of a market economy that
these countries are moving toward. Albeit a convincing argument, there are
few empirical studies on the specic model of a market economy that these
economies have chosen (e.g., Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Ho¤and Stiglitz, 2004).
In general, empirical evaluations of the various models of a market economy
are challenging because of the di¢ culty in quantifying the power of govern-
ment vis-à-vis market. In this paper, we ll in the void by quantifying the
power of government vis-à-vis market in the economy, and establish that
regulatory state is an appropriate model of a market economy for China.
The data used in this study comes from a survey conducted in 1999 con-
taining a sample of 3,073 private enterprises in China. In the survey, there
is a question regarding how an entrepreneur would resolve business disputes
with others. The available answers are: (i) doing nothing; (ii) negotiating
2The optimal target model depends on the institutional constraints and new develop-
ments in an economy. The experience of currently developed economies provides support
to this view. According to Glaeser and Shleifer (2003), there was a change in the optimal
model of a market economy in the U.S. in the late 19th century. Before then, private
litigation through courts was the major model of a market economy. However, the mas-
sive industrialization and commercialization of the American economy in the 19th century
generated increasing disorder and undermined the courts as the sole institution securing
property rights. Hence, the U.S. market economy leaned toward the model of a regulatory
state.
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between themselves; (iii) seeking help from private network; (iv) court ruling;
and (v) seeking government help. We group these answers into three cate-
gories corresponding to the three models of a market economy proposed by
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003), and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003): private orderings for answers (i), (ii), and
(iii); private litigation through courts for answer (iv); and regulatory state for
answer (v).3
To measure the power of government vis-à-vis market in each region,4 we
rst assign ordinal values 1, 2 and 3 to these three categories, i.e., value 1 for
private orderings, value 2 for private litigation through courts, and value 3
for regulatory state. A variable called Power of Government vis-à-vis Market
is then constructed for each region based on the average value of the power
of government vis-à-vis market perceived by the enterprises located in that
region, with a higher value indicating a greater power of government vis-à-vis
market.
We nd that private enterprises located in regions with greater powers of
government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes have better enter-
prise performance. Our results suggest that regulatory state is an appropriate
model of a market economy for China. These results, however, could be bi-
ased due to some omitted variable and reverse causality issues. We then
control for a host of variables related to entrepreneurial characteristics, en-
terprise characteristics, regional characteristics, and industry dummies, and
nd that our results remain robust to these controls.
To further deal with the possible endogeneity problems, we adopt the
instrumental variable approach. We choose the distance between the capital
of each region and the national capital city of China - Beijing - as an instru-
mental variable for the power of government vis-à-vis market in resolving
business disputes. Over several thousand years the Chinese political system
has always been characterized by the centralization of political power during
most of the periods. Even today, the central government keeps the power to
appoint regional government o¢ cials, and issues various laws and national
ordinances for them to guide the regional administrations. Given the sub-
stantial variations in endowments, socioeconomic development and culture
across regions in China, however, laws and national ordinances enacted by the
central government tend to be sketchy in nature, and need to be interpreted
and enforced by the regional governments so as to make them more adapted
3In Section 2, we will discuss administrative structures in China and explain why we
take reply (v) as an indicator of regulatory state.
4Here region refers to 22 provinces, 4 province-level municipalities, and 5 minority
autonomous regions in China, and government refers to the regional governments rather
than the central government.
4
to local circumstances. Meanwhile, the degree of central government control
over regional governments becomes weaker in regions farther away from Bei-
jing, allowing more freedom for the regional government o¢ cials to interpret
and enforce laws and national ordinances. Hence is the old Chinese saying of
"The Mountains Are High and the Emperor is Far Away." It is thus expected
that the power of government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes
is greater in regions that are farther away from Beijing. Indeed the rst
stage of two-stage-least-squares regressions conrms the positive correlation,
and the second stage shows that our earlier results regarding the impact of
the power of government vis-à-vis market on enterprise performance remains
signicant and robust to various controls.
For robustness checks, we use alternative measures of the power of gov-
ernment vis-à-vis market, focus on some subsamples of the dataset to address
specic types of business disputes, and control for the role of the capital-labor
ratio. Our results are robust to these exercises.
Our data set also allows us to test the predictions of the theoretical frame-
work proposed by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003) and Djankov, Glaeser,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003): an increase of disorder costs
(i.e., expropriation by thieves, competitors, or tort-feasors) calls for a greater
power of government vis-à-vis market whereas an increase of dictatorship
costs (i.e., expropriation by governments) requires a lower power of govern-
ment vis-à-vis market. Indeed, we nd that enterprises facing more inuen-
tial competitors (which implies higher disorder costs) perceive a greater need
for the power of government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes
whereas the opposite is found when enterprises face more expropriation by
the governments (which implies higher dictatorship costs).
One may interpret our results as that those enterprises located in regions
with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market conduct more rent seeking
activities and thus achieve better enterprise performance. We investigate this
possibility by looking at various channels (i.e., input procurement, access to
bank loans, availability of production locations, supply of electricity and
water, recruitment of skilled labor, sales of products, and sales of services)
in which enterprises may obtain favors through rent seeking activities. It is
found that enterprises located in regions with greater powers of government
vis-à-vis market do not obtain any favors along these channels, thereby ruling
out the rent seeking as the driving force behind our results.
One may still be curious to know why Chinas regional government of-
cials have incentives to enforce private contracts and resolve business dis-
putes. Here we can draw insights from a large literature on Chinas eco-
nomic reform. It is argued that Chinas central government has adopted s-
cal decentralization policy by delegating substantial discretion over regional
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economies to regional governments while maintaining its strict political con-
trol over regional governments, especially in the appointment and promotion
of regional government o¢ cials. Under this institutional arrangement, the
regional government o¢ cials have incentives to cultivate satisfactory business
environments and promote economic development so as to enhance their pri-
vate benets of being in power and the chances of being further promoted
(e.g., Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005; Roland,
Qian, and Xu, 2006; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data
and variables. Empirical results and their interpretations are presented in
Section 3. The paper concludes with Section 4.
2 Data and Variables
The dataset used in this paper comes from the Private Enterprise Survey
in China, which was conducted in 1999 jointly by the United Front Work
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,
the All China Industry and Commerce Federation, and the China Society of
Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.5
Multi-stage stratied random sampling method is used in the Survey to
achieve a balanced representation across all regions and industries in China.
The total number of private enterprises to be surveyed was rst determined.
Afterwards, six cities/counties were selected from each of the thirty-one
province-level regions (i.e., the 22 provinces, 4 province-level municipalities
and 5 minority autonomous regions), which included the capital city of each
region, one district-level city, one county-level city, and three counties. Then
the number of private enterprises to be surveyed in each region was calcu-
lated as the product of the regions share of private enterprises in the national
total with the total number of private enterprises in the survey. The same
method was used to determine the number of sample enterprises in every
city/county or industry. Finally, private enterprises were randomly chosen
from each sub-sample.
The initial sample size is 3,073 enterprises. After deleting observations
with no industry code, no sales and no employment gure, we obtain the
nal sample of 2,616 private enterprises. Table 1 shows the distribution of
the initial sample and nal sample across regions in China as well as the
5This dataset has been used by other research papers, e.g., Bai, Lu, and Tao (2006) in
studying the access to bank loans by private enterprises, Li, Meng, and Zhang (2006) in
studying entrepreneurs and their political participation, and Du, Lu, and Tao (2008) in
examining the impacts of property rights protection on enterprise diversication.
6
percentage of enterprises with complete information. Jiangsu, Shandong and
Guangdong have the largest numbers of observations while Tibet, Qinghai
and Ningxia have the smallest. The average percentage of enterprises with
complete information across regions is 83.72% with standard deviation 0.086,
which means the nal sample is representative.
The dependent variable for our study is Enterprise Performance, mea-
sured by the logarithm of output per worker. This is consistent with the
convention in the literature investigating the impacts of the quality of in-
stitutions on economic performance and growth. For example, Hall and
Jones (1999) use the logarithm of output per worker to study the e¤ects of
social infrastructures, i.e., institutions and government policies, on the cross-
country di¤erences in economic performance. Later studies such as Bock-
stette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) and Masters and McMillan (2002)
follow suit. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) use logarithm of
GDP per capita, which is similar in nature to the variable used here but at a
more aggregate level, to study the e¤ects of institutional quality on economic
growth. Subsequent studies including Alcala and Ciccone (2004), Glaeser, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)
adopt the same country-level performance variable. Panda and Udry (2005)
provide a good summary of the uses of variables in this literature.
The key explanatory variable in our study is the power of government vis-
à-vis market in each region. There is one question in the Survey regarding
how private entrepreneurs would deal with business disputes. The available
answers are: (i) doing nothing; (ii) negotiating between themselves; (iii) seek-
ing help from private network; (iv) court ruling; and (v) seeking government
help. We group them into three categories corresponding closely to the three
alternative models of a market economy, as proposed by Glaeser and Shleifer
(2002, 2003) and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2003): private orderings for answers (i), (ii), and (iii); private litigation
through courts for answer (iv), and regulatory state for answer (v). Here we
take a broad denition of regulatory state, which includes not only enactment
of laws and national ordinances, but also interpretation and enforcement of
laws and national ordinances (e.g., Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer, 2001),
which, in our view, is particularly relevant to the case of China. China has
a centralized political system, in which the central government appoints the
regional government o¢ cials and enacts laws and national ordinances for
them to guide their administrations. Due to the substantial variations in en-
dowments, socioeconomic development and culture across regions, however,
it is di¢ cult for the central government to enact unied laws and national
ordinances applicable to all regions. For example, it took 12 years for the
National Peoples Congress to pass the Law on Township and Village Enter-
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prises (Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2008). As a result, laws and national
ordinances enacted by the central government tend to be sketchy in nature
and need to be interpreted and enforced by the regional governments so as to
make them more adapted to local circumstances. Seeking government help
in resolving business disputes involves the interpretation and enforcement of
laws and national ordinances by the regional governments. Hence, we take
seeking government help in business disputesas an indicator of regulatory
state.
We then assign ordinal value of 1, 2 and 3 to the three categories re-
spectively, i.e., value 1 for private orderings, value 2 for private litigation
through courts, and value 3 for regulatory state. A variable called Power of
Government vis-à-vis Market is then constructed for each region based on
average value of the power of government vis-à-vis market perceived by the
enterprises located in that region, with a higher value indicating a greater
power of government vis-à-vis market. There are variations in the power of
government vis-à-vis market across Chinas regions, with a mean of 1.24 and
a standard deviation of 0.13.
To alleviate the concern of omitted variables, we include a host of vari-
ables that may a¤ect enterprise performance. The background and capability
of entrepreneurs can be important determinants of private enterprise perfor-
mance. Therefore, we include some conventional managerial human capital
variables like Age (the age of the entrepreneur by the end of 1999), Educa-
tion (years of formal schooling), andManagerial Experiences (the number of
years an entrepreneur had held a managerial position before he or she started
his or her own business), and some political participation variables such as
CPC Membership (a dummy variable taking value one if the entrepreneur
is a member of the Chinese Peoples Congress and zero otherwise) and CP-
PCC Membership (a dummy variable taking value one if the entrepreneur
is a member of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference and
zero otherwise), Government Cadre (a dummy variable taking value one if
the entrepreneur used to be a government o¢ cial and zero otherwise), and
SOE Cadre (a dummy variable taking value one if the entrepreneur used
to be a manager in state-owned enterprises). We also control for enterprise
characteristics, such as Enterprise Size (the logarithm of the number of em-
ployees in each enterprise) and Enterprise Age (the logarithm of the number
of years an enterprise had been established by the end of 1999), that have
been suggested to be important for enterprise performance, and include in-
dustry dummies to account for possible di¤erences across industries. Finally,
regional characteristics such as local market size measured by the Logarithm
of GDP, and infrastructure measured by the Logarithm of Railway Density,
are also included.
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To further address the potential endogeneity issue, we adopt the instru-
mental variable approach. Specically, we use the distance between the cap-
ital city of each region and the national capital of China - Beijing - as an
instrumental variable for the power of government vis-à-vis market in resolv-
ing business disputes (details will be discussed in Section 3.2).
Summary statistics of all key variables are given in Table 2.
3 Main Results
3.1 Benchmark Regressions
To investigate the impacts of the power of government vis-à-vis market on
enterprise performance, we estimate the following equation:
yeir = i + Gr + Rr +X
0
eir + "eir (1)
where yeir is the performance of enterprise e in region r and industry i, i is
the industry dummy, Gr represents the power of government vis-à-vis market
in region r, Rr is a vector of regional characteristics, X
0
eir is a vector of other
control variables (i.e., entrepreneurial and enterprise characteristics), and "eir
is a random error term.
In general the standard errors for micro-level data need to be adjusted for
possible clustering to deal with the heteroskadasticity problem (e.g., Liang
an Zeger, 1986). When the number of clusters is small (i.e., less than 42),
however, the clustered standard errors could be misleading and unreliable
(e.g., Wooldridge, 2003, 2006; Angrist and Pischke, 2008). As the number
of clusters in our study is 31, we follow Angrist and Lang (2004) in using
the White-robust standard errors, i.e., HC1 (White, 1980; MacKinnon and
White, 1985).
Table 3 shows the ordinary-least-squares estimation results for equation
(1) regarding the impacts of the power of government vis-à-vis market on
enterprise performance. Column 1 reports the benchmark regression results
that Power of Government vis-à-vis Market produces a positive and statis-
tically signicant e¤ect on enterprise performance.
Our results are robust when control variables related to entrepreneurial
characteristics and enterprise characteristics are included stepwisely (Columns
2 and 3 of Table 3). The coe¢ cients of control variables also make sense.
It is found that an entrepreneur with a higher level of education and more
years of being manager in a state-owned enterprise enjoys better enterprise
performance. It is also found that smaller enterprises exhibit higher impetus
to growth.
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The basic message conveyed by Table 3 is clear: A greater power of gov-
ernment vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes enhances enterprise
performance. The result suggest that regulatory state is an appropriate model
of a market economy for China. This can be understood as China lacks se-
cure protection of private properties and independence of judges, which are
essential for the functioning of private orderings and private litigation through
courts.
3.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation
The estimation results in Table 3 could be biased due to the endogeneity
issues. For example, we may not exhaust all the possible variables that
correlate with both the power of government vis-à-vis market and enterprise
performance. Meanwhile, enterprises with better performance may be more
likely to cluster in regions with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market.
To address these potential endogeneity issues, we adopt the instrumental
variable estimation strategy. Specically, the instrumental variable used is
the distance between the capital city of each region and the national capital,
Beijing, where the central government is located.
Over thousands of years the Chinese political system has been character-
ized by the centralization of political power during most of the periods. The
central government keeps the power to appoint regional government o¢ cials.
It also issues various laws and national ordinances to guide the regional ad-
ministrations. Because China is a large country with substantial variations
in endowments, socioeconomic development and culture across regions, how-
ever, unied laws and national ordinances may be ill-suited for the local
conditions of some regions. Thus it is essential for regional government of-
cials to interpret and enforce laws and national ordinances so as to make
them more adapted to the local circumstances. Meanwhile, it is more costly
for the central government to frequently inspect local situations and monitor
local bureaucrats in regions farther away from Beijing. Consequently, the
higher degree of information asymmetry makes the central government more
reliant on local o¢ cials in regional governance. Thus, regional bureaucrats in
regions farther away from Beijing are subject to less central control and have
a greater degree of freedom in interpreting and enforcing laws and national
ordinances. In other words, regional government o¢ cials in regions farther
away from Beijing have greater de facto powers in running the regional econ-
omy. Indeed there is an old Chinese saying that "The Mountains Are High
and the Emperor is Far Away." It is thus expected that in regions farther
away from Beijing, the powers of regional government vis-à-vis market in
resolving business disputes are greater.
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One concern of the validity of this instrumental variable is that it might
a¤ect enterprise performance through channels other than the power of gov-
ernment vis-à-vis market, such as climate and endowments. This, however,
should not be a concern in our case. The national capital, Beijing, is located
in the northern-central area of the country with many regions lying to the
north, south, west or east of the capital. Therefore, distance from Beijing
does not suggest any particular endowment and climate characteristics. For
example, Harbin, the capital city of Heilongjiang province and Shanghai have
similar distances from Beijing with linear distances of 1,049 kilometers and
1,066 kilometers from Beijing, respectively. However, these two regions have
striking di¤erences in endowments and climate.
Figure 2 shows the positive correlation between the power of regional
government vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes and the distance
between regional capital city and Beijing. Table 4 presents the two-stage-
least-squares estimation results. The rst-stage regression results reported in
Column 1 show that the distance between regional capital city and Beijing
has a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient, which conrms our ar-
gument that in regions farther away from Beijing the powers of government
vis-à-vis market in resolving business disputes are greater. Meanwhile, the
relevance condition for our instrumental variable is further conrmed by the
Anderson cannonical LR statistic. And the Cragg-Donald F-statistic rules
out the concern for weak instrument.6
Column 2 of Table 4 presents the second-stage regression results. The
results reinforce our earlier ndings and show that the power of government
vis-à-vis market has a positive and statistically signicant causal e¤ect on en-
terprise performance. Our main results the statistically signicant positive
impacts of the power of government vis-à-vis market on enterprise perfor-
mance remain robust when entrepreneurial and enterprise characteristics
are included as control variables (in Columns 3-4 of Table 4).
3.3 Robustness Checks
First, we investigate whether our main results are robust to alternative ordi-
nal values assigned to the three categories of a market economy, i.e., private
orderings, private litigations through courts, and regulatory state in construct-
ing the index of the power of government vis-à-vis market. In Section 2, we
assigned values 1-3 to these three categories of a market economy with the
purpose of showing an increasing power of government vis-à-vis market. One
6The Cragg-Donald F-statistic values for our regressions are signicantly above the
value of 10, which is considered as the critical value by Staiger and Stock (1997).
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may argue that the ordinal values assigned look somewhat arbitrary. To
make sure that the absolute value assigned to each category does not matter
but the relative ranking is important, we experiment with di¤erent values
attached to each category. In the rst experiment, we give the value of 1 to
private orderings, 2 to private litigations through courts and 10 to regulatory
state. In the second experiment, we let private orderings be 1, private liti-
gation be 9 and regulatory state be 10. In the third experiment, we assign
values of 1, 5 and 10 to private orderings, private litigations and regulatory
state, respectively.
Columns 2-4 of Table 5 summarize the estimation results when the above
three alternative constructions for the power of government vis-à-vis market
are used, while Column 1 simply replicates Column 4 of Table 4 as the
benchmark for comparison. All the control variables are included in the
regressions but not reported to save space. It is clear that our main results
reported in Tables 3-4 remain robust when we vary the values assigned to
di¤erent categories of a market economy, which conrms that the exact value
assigned to each category does not matter, but the relative ranking of the
three categories is important.
Second, we use an alternative measure of the power of government vis-
à-vis market. Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2003) has an index on the power of
government in the economy, with a higher value indicating a lower power
of government in the economy. Column 1 of Table 6 shows that the Fan-
Wang-Zhu index is negatively correlated with the distance between regional
capital city and Beijing (in Panel B of Column 1), and it has a negative and
statistically signicant causal e¤ect on enterprise performance (in Panel A of
Column 1), which are consistent with our earlier ndings.
Third, we test the robustness of our results using a subsample of our
dataset. In the Survey, there is a question regarding the identity of the party
with whom an enterprise is having business disputes. It could be: with cus-
tomers, or suppliers, or government agencies. As disputes with government
agencies could be qualitatively di¤erent from those with commercial partners,
we restrict our sample to those observations with only commercial disputes.
Column 2 of Table 6 shows that our central results remain robust to the use
of this subsample.
Lastly, it has been argued that enterprise performance could be a¤ected
by the capital-labor ratio. Unfortunately, there is quite a lot of missing
information on the amount of capital employed by enterprises in our dataset.
Nonetheless, we conduct a robustness test based on a reduced sample by
including the logarithm of the capital-labor ratio as a control variable for
enterprise performance. As shown in Column 3 of Table 6, our main results
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still hold in this subsample.7
Overall, our robustness analysis as summarized in Tables 5-6 conrms our
earlier nding that the power of government vis-a-vis market has a positive
and signicant causal e¤ect on enterprise performance in China.
3.4 A Comparative Statics Analysis
Our above empirical analysis is based on the theoretical framework proposed
by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003) and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003). To lend support for our empirical analysis,
we test the predictions of this theoretical framework regarding when there
is a need for a greater power of government vis-à-vis market in choosing the
appropriate model of a market economy. As argued by Glaeser and Shleifer
(2002, 2003) and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2003), the appropriate model of a market economy should balance disorder
costs (which are caused by the expropriation by thieves, competitors, or
tort-feasors) and dictatorship costs (which are caused by the expropriation
by governments). Thus, a greater power of government vis-à-vis market is
expected when disorder costs are higher and/or dictatorship costs are lower.
The Survey contains information that allows us to gauge the disorder costs
and dictatorship costs perceived by entrepreneurs, based on which we can
carry out a comparative statics analysis.
In the Survey, one question asks each entrepreneur whether there exist
inuential producers in his/her industry that enjoy favorable market posi-
tions to facilitate input procurement and output sales and therefore they
are dominant players in the market. It is expected that when facing such
dominant competitors, private enterprises encounter higher disorder costs8
and perceive a greater need for government regulations to alleviate mar-
ket disorders (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003). We construct a dummy variable called
Inuential Competitors, and carry out an Ordered Probit regression of Power
of Government vis-à-vis Market on Inuential Competitors along with a set
of control variables. As shown in Column 1 of Table 7, Inuential Competi-
tors has a positive and statistically signicant estimated coe¢ cient, which
implies that the increase of disorder costs leads to a rise in the power of gov-
ernment vis-à-vis market as predicted by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003)
and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003).
7The decrease in the magnitude and signicance of the estimated coe¢ cient could be
due to the dramatic decrease of sample size.
8For example, private enterprises often encounter di¢ culties in collecting payments
from large inuential enterprises with whom they have businesses.
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In the Survey, another question asks entrepreneurs about the amount of
extralegal payments to the government made by the enterprises. As argued
by Johnson, McMillan and Woodru¤ (2002) and Cull and Xu (2005), extrale-
gal payments to the goverment measures the extent of government expropri-
ation. It is thus expected that enterprises facing higher extralegal payments
to the government encounter higher dictatorship costs and perceive a lesser
need for the power of government vis-à-vis market such as less government
regulation (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003). We then construct a variable called
Ratio of Extralegal Payments (measured as the ratio of extralegal payments
to the government by the enterprise over its prot) and use it as a proxy for
dictatorship costs, with a higher value indicating greater dictatorship costs.
We carry out an Ordered Probit regression of Power of Government vis-à-vis
Market on Ratio of Extralegal Payments along with a set of control variables.
As shown in Column 2 of Table 7, Ratio of Extralegal Payments has a nega-
tive and statistically signicant estimated coe¢ cient, which implies that the
increase of dictatorship costs leads to a fall of the power of government vis-
à-vis market as predicted by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003) and Djankov,
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003).
3.5 Does Rent Seeking Drive Our Results?
One may interpret our results as that those enterprises located regions with
greater powers of government vis-à-vis market conduct more rent seeking ac-
tivities and achieve better enterprise performance because they secure favors
and protection from bureaucrats that enhance their business protability. Of
course, asking for government help in resolving business disputes could pos-
sibly reect rent seeking activity. However, the issue is whether rent seeking
is the dominant force that drives the positive relationship between the power
of government vis-à-vis market and enterprise performance.
Presumably if rent seeking is the driving force, an enterprise located in
a region with a greater power of government vis-à-vis market would most
likely obtain favors from the government in the forms of lower production
costs and/or easier sales of its product or service. In the Survey, there are
questions regarding whether the enterprise has di¢ culties in the following
seven aspects of the enterprise operation: input procurement, access to bank
loans, availability of production locations, supply of electricity and water,
recruitment of skilled labor, sales of product, and sales of service. The an-
swers to the access to bank loans range from 1 to 5 whereas the answers for
the remaining six questions range from 1 to 3, with a higher value indicating
less di¢ culties in the specic operation. We conduct two-stage-least-squares
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regressions of these seven aspects of the enterprise operation on Power of
Government vis-à-vis Market with the instrumental variable being the dis-
tance between the regional capital city and the national capital, Beijing. As
show in Columns 1-7 of Table 8, six of the seven estimated coe¢ cients are
negative and the only positive one is statistically insignicant. These results
suggest that enterprises located in regions with greater powers of govern-
ment vis-à-vis market do not obtain favors in the forms of lower production
costs and/or easier sales of its product or service that are reected in these
seven aspects.9 In our opinion, these aspects we consider encompass all the
important concerns of private enterprises in China. According to Asian De-
velopment Bank (2003), the most serious constraints encountered by private
enterprises include the di¢ culty in getting access to external nance such
as bank loans and the di¢ culty in recruiting skilled managers and technical
sta¤. If rent seeking were the dominant force, at least some of the aspects
we have examined should have turned out positive and signicant estimated
coe¢ cients. Hence, we can largely rule out rent seeking as the primary force
that drives our results.10
One may be curious to know why Chinas regional government o¢ cials
have incentives to enforce private contracts and resolve business disputes
for the sake of, as a net e¤ect, improving business environment rather than
rent seeking. Here we can draw insights from the recent studies on market-
preserving federalism or regional decentralization in Chinas economic re-
forms (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005; Roland,
Qian, and Xu, 2006; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2008). It is argued that
the Chinese government system is characterized by substantial devolution of
administrative power from the central government to regional administra-
tions, in which scal federalism or scal decentralization is one prominent
feature. Nonetheless, at the same time the central government keeps the
political power to appoint, promote or sack regional governors. Governors of
regions with better economic performance are more likely to be promoted.
This regional decentralization under the control of the central government
is most likely to generate regional competition for economic growth through
9Alternatively, we have carried out another empirical test, in which these seven channel
variables are included as additional control variables in the regression of Enterprise Per-
formance on Power of Government vis-à-vis Market. The regression results, not reported
here (available upon request), show that there are no changes in the magnitude and sig-
nicance of our key explanatory variable, Power of Government vis-à-vis Market, thereby
ruling out the concern of rent seeking as the primary driving force for our main ndings.
10Presumably, a regional government more involved in resolving business disputes is
more likely to cultivate an institutional environment with better contract enforcement,
which subsequently leads to higher productivities of enterprises located in that region.
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various ways, one of which could be the interpretation and enforcement of
laws and national ordinanaces by regional bureaucrats. This could explain
to a large extent why rent seeking may not be the dominant force in shaping
the nature of regulatory state in China.
4 Conclusion
In the past decades, we have witnessed the transition of many developing
economies in various parts of the world toward the market economy. The
variations in their transition paths and economic performance have led to in-
tensive debates regarding the advantages and disadvantages of various mod-
els of a market economy. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003) and Djankov,
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) have argued that
there are three distinct models of a market economy, i.e., private orderings,
private litigations through courts, and regulatory state, with an increasing
power of government vis-à-vis market in the economy. As one moves from
private orderings, to private litigations through courts, and regulatory state,
the cost of disorder resulting from private expropriation decreases while that
of dictatorship coming from state expropriation increases. The equilibrium
choice then lies in the trade-o¤ between the cost of disorder and that of
dictatorship.
In this paper, using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in
China conducted in 1999, we construct an index to quantify the power of
government vis-à-vis market, and nd that the power of government vis-à-
vis market is benecial to enterprise performance. Our results are robust to a
set of controls related to entrepreneurial, enterprise, regional and industrial
characteristics, and to the use of instrumental variable estimation. These
results suggest that regulatory state is an appropriate model of a market
economy for China.
We also nd that the power of government vis-à-vis market is greater when
disorder costs are higher or dictatorship costs are lower, thereby suggesting
that the choice among the three models of market economy depends crucially
upon the quality of institutional environment. In the case of China, protec-
tion of private properties was not written into its constitution until 2004,
and the independence of courts is dubious. Thus, regulatory state emerges
as a second-best choice for China in its transition to a market economy.
Our ndings give an interpretation of Chinas successful reform drasti-
cally di¤erent from the earlier studies. The existing literature on economic
transition almost invariably focuses on the comparison of the incremental
reform approach in China versus the big bang approach in most other tran-
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sition economies such as Russia (e.g., Roland, Qian, and Xu, 1999, 2006).
That literature implicitly assumes that China and Russia share the same tar-
get model of a market economy, i.e., private orderings and private litigation
through courts, but only di¤er in their paths toward the target. However, in
our view, China adopts regulatory state as an appropriate target model of
a market economy based on the existing institutional constraints, which al-
lows the state to maintain social order, provide a reasonable level of property
rights protection, and avoid social disruption and disorganization in economic
restructuring. O¢ cially, China has been pursuing the "socialist market econ-
omy model" in which regional governments employ extensive regulations,
industrial policies and state ownership to promote economic development.
This is largely consistent with the regulatory state model. In contrast, Rus-
sia is widely perceived to have conducted radical transformations toward
laissez-faire capitalism, reected in some primary reform schemes such as the
Gaidar program in the 1990s (Randolph, 1994; Perotti, 2002; Aziz, 2006).
This interpretation also sheds light on the so-called China puzzle, i.e., China
achieved fast economic growth despite deeply awed economic institutions
including property rights protection and contract enforcement. According
to our thesis, this is largely because China has adopted regulatory state as
its model of a market economy, which requires few economic institutions to
sustain the operation of markets.
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Figure 1: Institutional possibility frontier 
 
 
 
The above figure is copied from Figure 1 of Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2003). 
 
Figure 2: Correlation between the power of regional government vis-à-vis 
market in resolving business disputes and the distance between regional capital 
city and Beijing 
 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of sample across China’s regions 
 
Region Final Sample Initial Sample Percentage Region Final Sample Initial Sample Percentage
Beijing 89 117 76.07% Hubei 84 125 67.20% 
Tianjin 86 100 86.00% Hunan 43 64 67.19% 
Herbei 135 198 68.18% Guangdong 137 193 70.98% 
Shanxi 38 76 50.00% Guangxi 37 47 78.72% 
Inner Mongolia 29 45 64.44% Hainan 29 54 53.70% 
Liaoning 124 148 83.78% Chongqing 89 97 91.75% 
Jilin 70 80 87.50% Sichuan 40 60 66.67% 
Heilongjiang 87 101 86.14% Guizhou 62 66 93.94% 
Shanghai 121 180 67.22% Yunnan 32 41 78.05% 
Jiangsu 242 279 86.74% Tibet 5 10 50.00% 
Zhejiang 114 165 69.09% Shaanxi 105 114 92.11% 
Anhui 54 78 69.23% Gansu 30 36 83.33% 
Fujian 33 63 52.38% Qinghai 8 11 72.73% 
Jiangxi 42 61 68.85% Ningxia 14 20 70.00% 
Shandong 185 250 74.00% Xinjiang 44 51 86.27% 
Henan 101 143 70.63%         
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Enterprise Performance 2309 1.85 1.27 -4.61 6.59 
Power of Government vis-à-vis Market 31 1.24 0.13 1.03 1.63 
Education 2307 12.64 2.84 0.00 19.00 
Age 2300 43.50 8.26 22.00 75.00 
Managerial Experience 2306 4.28 7.23 0.00 61.00 
CPC Membership 2309 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 
CPPCC Membership 2309 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Government Cadre 2309 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
SOE Cadre  2309 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Enterprise Size 2309 4.08 1.33 0.00 9.90 
Enterprise Age 2287 2.23 0.67 0.00 3.83 
Logarithm of Capital-Labor Ratio 1478 1.79 1.15 -2.96 7.25 
Logarithm of GDP 31 7.56 1.04 4.66 9.04 
Logarithm of Railway Density 30 -4.62 0.88 -6.80 -2.69 
Influential Competitors 2256 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Ratio of Extralegal Payments 1136 0.06 0.10 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 3: OLS estimates 
 
  1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Enterprise Performance 
Power of Government vis-à-vis Market 0.53* 0.54* 0.51* 
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics    
Education  0.07*** 0.08*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  -0.004 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Managerial Experience  0.004 0.01 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
CPC Membership  0.09 0.14** 
  (0.07) (0.07) 
CPPCC Membership  0.01 0.03 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
Government Cadre  -0.10 -0.08 
  (0.11) (0.11) 
SOE Cadre   0.19*** 0.19*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
Enterprise Characteristics    
Enterprise Size   -0.07*** 
   (0.02) 
Enterprise Age   0.03 
   (0.04) 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observation 2,304 2,290 2,270 
R-squared 0.0652 0.1014 0.1042 
p-value for F-Test 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Robust standard error is reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 Table 4 : 2SLS estimates 
 
  1 2 3 4 
 First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Dependent Variable 
Power of 
Government 
vis-à-vis Market 
Enterprise 
Performance 
Power of 
Government 
vis-à-vis Market 
Enterprise 
Performance 
Power of Government vis-à-vis Market  4.11***  3.64*** 
  (0.90)  (0.88) 
Distance 0.08***  0.08***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
Entrepreneurial Characteristics     
Education   -0.00 0.08*** 
   (0.00) (7.50) 
Age   -0.00 -0.003 
   (0.00) (0.003) 
Managerial Experience   0.00 0.006 
   (0.00) (0.004) 
CPC Membership   -0.00 0.15** 
   (0.00) (0.07) 
CPPCC Membership   -0.00 0.03 
   (0.00) (0.05) 
Government Cadre   -0.00 -0.07 
   (0.00) (0.11) 
SOE Cadre    -0.00 0.19*** 
   (0.00) (0.06) 
Enterprise Characteristics     
Enterprise Size   -0.002* -0.07*** 
   (0.001) (0.03) 
Enterprise Age   -0.005** 0.05 
   (0.002) (0.05) 
Shea Partial R2 0.1519 - 0.1527 - 
Anderson Canonical LR Statistic  [379.70]*** - [376.12]*** - 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 409.55 - 404.21 - 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observation 2,304 2,304 2,270 2,270 
Robust standard error is reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.  
Table 5: Experiments for the index of Power of Government vis-à-vis Market 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Dependent Variable Enterprise Performance 
Power of Government vis-à-vis Market 3.64*** 1.09*** 0.53*** 0.75*** 
 (0.88) (0.27) (0.12) (0.18) 
Shea Partial R2 0.1527 0.0847 0.1888 0.1698 
Anderson Canonical LR Statistic  [376.12]*** [200.98]*** [474.89]*** [422.52]*** 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 404.21 207.65 521.93 458.88 
Entrepreneurial characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Enterprise characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observation 2,270 2,270 2,270 2,270 
The estimation strategy used is 2SLS estimation. The First-stage results and the estimated coefficients 
of the control variable are not reported to save space (available upon request). Robust standard error is 
reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Table 6: Robustness checks 
 
  1 2 3 
Panel A: Second Stage of 2SLS  
Dependent Variable Enterprise Performance 
Fan-Zhu-Wang Index -0.18***   
 (0.04)   
Power of Government vis-à-vis Market  4.28*** 1.66* 
  (0.94) (0.94) 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics    
Education 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Managerial Experience 0.004 0.004 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
CPC Membership 0.16** 0.15* 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
CPPCC Membership 0.04 0.03 -0.11** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Government Cadre -0.11 -0.05 -0.22* 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
SOE Cadre  0.11* 0.16** 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Enterprise Characteristics    
Enterprise Size -0.09*** -0.06** -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Enterprise Age 0.04 0.03 -0.07 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Logarithm of Capital-Labor Ratio   0.64*** 
   (0.03) 
Panel B: First Stage of 2SLS 
Dependent Variable Fan-Zhu-Wang Index Power of Government vis-à-vis Market 
Distance -1.68*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.11) (0.01) (0.03) 
Shea Partial R2 0.1542 0.1697 0.1278 
Anderson Canonical LR Statistic  [380.22]*** [349.60]*** [199.39]*** 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 409.00 378.70 209.71 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observation 2,270 1,880 1,458 
The first stage of 2SLS includes the same control variables as those in the second stage but does not 
report these results to save the space (available upon request). Robust standard error is reported in the 
parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Table 7: Comparative statistics analysis 
 
  1 2 
Dependent Variable Power of Government vis-à-vis Market 
Influential Competitors 0.16**  
 (0.07)  
Ratio of Extralegal Payments  -1.02* 
  (0.59) 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics   
Education -0.03** -0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.004) (0.01) 
Managerial Experience -0.003 -0.01 
 (0.004) (0.01) 
CPC Membership -0.06 -0.14 
 (0.09) (0.13) 
CPPCC Membership -0.06 -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.10) 
Government Cadre -0.07 -0.21 
 (0.13) (0.20) 
SOE Cadre  -0.01 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.10) 
Corporate Characteristics   
Enterprise Size 0.10*** 0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Enterprise Age -0.01 -0.09 
 (0.05) (0.09) 
Regional Characteristics   
Logarithm of GDP -0.12*** -0.12** 
 (0.04) (0.06) 
Logarithm of Railway Density -0.02 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.05) 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
Number of Observation 2,217 1,124 
Pseudo R2 0.0329 0.0423 
p-value for chi2 0.0000  0.0000  
The estimation strategy used is the ordered probit estimation. Robust standard error is reported in the 
parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Table 8: Investigation of rent seeking explanation 
 
Dependent Variable Input Procurement 
Access to 
Bank Loans
Availability of 
Production 
Locations 
Supply of 
Electricity and 
Water  
Recruitment 
of Skilled 
Labor 
Sales of Output Sales of Service
Power of Government vis-à-vis Market -0.45 0.61 -1.37*** -0.42 -1.14** -1.59*** -1.81*** 
 (0.35) (0.72) (0.44) (0.35) (0.51) (0.55) (0.57) 
Shea Partial R2 0.1527 0.1554 0.1495 0.1476 0.1446 0.1369 0.1215 
Anderson Canonical LR Statistic  [318.50]*** [361.06]*** [298.65]*** [307.93]*** [283.88]*** [275.93]*** [220.71]*** 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 342.31 388.37 319.44 329.21 302.68 293.00 232.04 
Entrepreneurial characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Enterprise characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observation 1,863 2,138 1,845 1,928 1,818 1, 874 1,704 
The estimation strategy used is 2SLS estimation. The First-stage results and the estimated coefficients of the control variable are not reported to save space (available upon 
request). Robust standard are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
